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while here the tax is upon the franchise and valid, within the decision in Paul
v. Virginia, 8 Wall. x68, and Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S.
305. From this decision Houlan, J. (Brown, J., concurring), vigorously dis-
sents, maintaining that whatever was the "object" of those who passed the
statute, its effect was to place a burden on interstate commerce, and cannot be
sustained simply because the statute applies alike to the people of all states,
including New York. Hinn. v. Barber, supra, and Robbinsv. Taxizng Distr.,
supra. The case of Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, supra, did not pre-
sent the precise point here involved as to the authority of the state to tax the
manufactures of another state, solely because not products of the taxing state.
By this statute New York practically seeks to compel manufacturing concerns
of other states to remove their plant to New York or else submit to a taxation,
at the discretion of the authorities, which is not imposed on such concerns
wholly domestic.
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CARRIERS-CONTRACT OF CARYIAGE-BAGGAGE--PACKAGES IN CAR-RuNYAN
V. CENTRAL R. C. OF N. J., 41 AUt. (N. J.) 367.-Plaintiff bought a ticket from
New York to Elizabeth, N. J., on which was printed the following: "Free
transportation allowed for i5o lbs. baggage (wearing apparel only) and Co.'s
liability expressly limited to $x per lb." With this ticket the plaintiff tried to
enter a car, but was prevented because he had with him two packages, the con-
tents of which he would not disclose to the railway attendant. On his trial, the
plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that the railway had for a long time
acquiesced in, and made accommodation for the carriage of small packages of
merchandise of its passengers. This was held (four judges dissenting) to be
competent evidence, and its refusal was error.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAw-DIScISMUNATION-MUNICIpAL
CORPORATIONS-PLEASURE DRIVEWAYS-ExcLuSION OF TRAFFIC-ORDINANCES-
CICERO LUMBER Co. v. TowN OF CICERO ET AL., 51 N. E. (Ill.) 758.-The legisla-
tive power to authorize a municipality to vacate any of its streets includes the
the power to authorize it to limit the use of certain of them to a particular pur-
pose beneficial to the public. Laws, 1889, p. 83, by which the trustees of an
incorporated town were empowered to lay out not more than two streets as
public driveways for pleasure driving only, on petition of a designated num-
ber of the owners of property fronting thereon, and to exclude all other traffic,
is not unconstitutional, as depriving an owner thereon of property without
due process of law (Const., Art. 2, §2); nor is it class legislation and unjust
discrimination, since any citizen may use the road for pleasure only; nor is it
a violation of trust imposed on municipal authorities in'respect to highways.
But an ordinance passed by a municipality under this act, forbidding the use
of two streets laid out for a pleasure driveway by traffic vehicles unless special
permission of the board of trustees of the town has been obtained, is un-
reasonable and invalid, since it leaves to unregulated official discretion a
matter which should be regulated by permanent local provisions operating
generally and impartially.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoliE POWER-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-DISPENSARY
LAw-CNTRABAND LIQUORS--STATE V. HOLLEYMAN ET AL., 31 S. E. (S. C.) 362.
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-The Dispensary Act of March 6, 1896, Sec. 37, providing that "any person
handling contraband liquors in the night time or delivering the same shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor," held, by a divided court, (McIver C. J., and Gary,
A. J., dissenting) to be a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and
not violative of the interstate commerce clause (Art. 1, §8) of the Federal Con-
stitution. Also, intoxicating liquor purchased outside the state by a party and
by him carried across the state line for his own use is "contraband" after its
arrival in the state, unless the regulations of the dispensary law of 1895 have
been complied with. The court considered that the U. S. Supreme Court in
Scott v. Donald, 165, U. S. 68, meant to declare the dispensary act of 1895 in-
valid only in so far as the state thereby attempted to interdict the delivery by
a common carrier of any alcoholic liquors from without the state to a con-
signee within the state for his own use; and that by "arrival," as used in the
"Wilson Bill" (Act of Aug. 8, 189o), was meant the arrival of such liquors into
the hands of the consignee within the state. Vance v. W. A. Vandercook,
170 U. S. 438; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412.
CORPORATIONS-CONSTRUCTION OF CHARTER-SOUTH & N. A. R. R. Co.
v. HIGHLAND AVE. & R. R. Co., 24 S. 114 (Ala.).-A power to "build, own
and operate street railroads," does not convey by implication the power to
construct a freight railroad around a city to transfer freight cars. Street rail-
road means a railway passenger carrier whose road lies along and upon the
streets of a city, town or village.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-CURTIS V. STATE, 24 S. xii (Ala.).-On trial for
forgery of a mortgage a witness was allowed to testify that he had refused
defendant advances without further security, that defendant had said he had
other security mortgages and the like, and that shortly after the mortgage in
question was given witness by the defendant and advances made. Held
admissible, two justices taking the ground that it was admissible to show
motive, two deciding that it was admissible to show the course of business
between witness and defendant. Brickell, C. J., dissents on the ground that
the testimony is immaterial and irrelevant.
CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMENT-DATE OF OFFENSE-CONRAD V. STATE, 47
S. W. '628 (Ark.).-An indictment found July 14, 1896, charged that the
accused did commit an offense May 15, 1898. The statutes provided that
the indictment must contain "a statement of the acts constituting the offense
in ordinary and concise language and in such a manner as to enable a person
of common understanding to know what was intended," and that "the state-
ment of the indictment as to the time at which the offense was committed is not
material further than as a statement that it was committed before the time of
the finding of the indictment." Held, Riddick, J., dissenting, that the indict-
ment was good.
CRIMINAL LAw-LARCENY-FALSE PRETENSES-PROcURING MoNEY FOR
SPECIAL PURPOSE-INTENT TO APPROPRIATE-PEOPLE V. SUMNER, 53 N. Y. Sup.
817.-In negotiating a sale of land for his principals, defendant broker falsely
represented to the complainant that he had an arrangement by which it could
be transferred to another person at a large profit. Upon the payment of a small
amount of the purchase price, defendant assured the complainant that upon
the further immediate payment of $i,ooo the purchase price would be reduced
one-third. The $iooo was accordingly delivered to the defendant under an
agreement that it should not be paid to anybody until the title was examined.
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Defendant never paid the money to anybody and never intended to. Heldf,
that the facts established a common law larceny and not the obtaining of
property under false pretenses. McLaughlin, J., dissented on the grounds
that the money was not deposited. for a special purpose, but was paid to apply
upon the purchase price.
DAMAGES-DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-PUNITIVE DAMAGEs-GARRICK V.
FLORIDA CENT. & P. R. Co., 31 S. E. (S. C.) 334.-The act (Rev. St. sec. 2315-2318)
"to provide for compensation in damages to the families of persons killed by the
fault of others," and designating for whose benefit the action may be brought,
and that "the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to
the injury resulting from such death to the parties" for whom such action is
brought, held, one judge dissenting, not to entitle the jury to award punitive
damages in cases where the death was caused by gross negligence. And
this the court held to be the case independent of whether the right of action
conferred by the statute is considered as but a continuation of the same cause
of action which deceased would have had if death had not ensued.
DAMAGES-INJURY TO EMPLOYEE OF LICENSEE-LAKE ERIE & W. R. Co.
V. MANS, 51 N. E. (Ind.) 735.-One railroad company agreed to allow another
to connect its standpipe with the water-tank of grantor, and for a considera-
tion to use water therefrom to fill its locomotives; and grantee was also given
the right to enter on grantor's property to make any.necessary repairs or to
remove the connections at any time after the agreement should terminate.
Held, there being no covenant to repair, grantor was not liable to an employee
of grantee for injuries caused to him by a defect in a stationary ladder on
the water-tank, while he was repairing the tank, and this whether the agree-
ment be considered as a license or a lease. Court said that if plaintiff could
recover, it must be by reason of some undischarged duty of defendant to him,
arising out of the relations between them which result from the contract
between defendant and plaintiff's employee. But see Nugent v. Boston, Con-
cord &- Montreal R. R., 8o Me. 62; and Driscoll v. Norwich 6- Worcester
R. R., 65 Conn. 230, 32 Art. 354.
EMINENT DOMAIN-CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS-REPORT OF APPRAISERS-
DISCRETION-SCHNEIDER V. CITY OF ROCHESTER, 53 N. Y. Sup. 931.-The char-
ter of the city of Rochester provided that the city council might confirm the
report of commissioners appointed by the court to appraise damages to the
owner of property taken for public use or reject it and order another appraise-
ment by the same or new commissioners. Held, the council might in their
discretion affirm or annul the report. Follett, J., dissented on the ground that
it was not the intent of the statute that an appraisal should be arbitrarily set
aside without any evidence. Under such a statute the proceedings might be
continued indefinitely, and expose one to the expense and trouble of defend-
ing the proceedings during such period, as the whim or caprice of the moving
party might continue them.
ESTATES-HUSBAND AND WIFE-LETTERS OF CREDIT-ESTATE BY ENTIRE-
TIES.-IN RE PERRY'S ESTATE, 41 Atl. Rep. 448 (Pa.).-A letter of credit was
taken in the names of a husband and wife jointly, although it was paid for
with the husband's money. At the death of the husband there was an unex-
pended balance due thereon. Held, that such balance was the property of the
wife, as an estate by entirety had been created.
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EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-HENDERSHOTT V. W. U. TEL. Co.,
76 N. W. (Ia.) 828.-A veterinary surgeon, who had attended plaintiff's horse,
was asked what plaintiff said as to the doctor's visiting the horse, and the
report that had been received from the keeper as to the condition of the horse.
Plaintiff objected to the questions, and his objection was sustained on the
ground that it was a disclosure of professional communications, contrary to
Code of 1873, Sec. 3643. Held, error: The privilege does not extend to vet-
erinary surgeons called to treat animals.
INNKEEPERS-LIENS--GOODS OF THIRD PERSON-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
CIcCLAIN V. WILLIAMS, 76 N. W. 930 (So. Dak.).-Where the statute, Laws,
1893, c. 102, provides that innkeepers shall be liable for all losses or injuries to
personal property placed by guests in their care, andshall have a lien thereon for
their charges; thatbaggage and other property "belonging" to any person who
absconds, after obtaining board without paying his bill, may be disposed of by
the innkeeper after thirty days. Court held, that the common law rule was
thereby changed, so as to deprive an innkeeper of his lien on goods of a third
person brought to the inn by a guest and left there. Court also held, that a
statute creating a lien on the goods of a third person under such circumstances
would be in violation of the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of prop-
erty from any person against his consent, express or implied, except by due
process of law.
INsURANcE-CONsTRUCTIoN OF POLICY-DEATH FROm PoIsoN-MCGLOTHER
V. PROVIDENT MUTUAL Acc. Co. OF PHILADELHIA, 89 Fed. 685.-An accident
insurance policy excepted from the risk "death from poison." Held, that the
exception covered poison taken under the supposition that it was harmless
medicine. Thayer, Circuit Judge, dissenting, on the ground that the excep-
tion covered only deaths accidentally resulting from a knowing taking of
poison.
INSURANCE-MORTGAGEE CLAUSE-CONSTRUCTION OF CONDITIONS-QUEEN
INSURANCE CO. v. DEARBORN SAVINGS, LOAN AND BUILDING ASSOCIATION, 5i
N. E. Rep. 717. (Ill.).-An insurance policy contained a clause limiting the
time within which proof of loss must be made and action brought. Held, that
these provisions applied only to the insured and not to the mortgagee, when
there was a mortgagee clause attached providing that "if, with the consent of
this company, an interest under this policy shall exist in favor of a mortgagee,
* * * the conditions hereinbefore contained shall apply in the manner
expressed in such provisions and conditions of insurance relating to such
interest as shall be written upon, attached or appeided thereto.
LIBEL-SUFFICIENCY OF PUBLICATION-OWEN V. OGILVIE PUB. Co., 53 N. Y.
Sup. 1o3 3 .- A general manager of a corporation dictated a libelous letter to a
stenographer in the employ of the corporation. The letter was then copied
and mailed. Held, such did not constitute a "publication." The dictating,
copying and mailing constituted but one act and by but one person, the cor-
poration.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-USE OF STREETS-WHEEL TAx-DOUBLE TAX-
ATION-UNIFORMITY-CITY OF CHICAGO V. COLLINS. 51 N. E. Rep. (Il.) 9o7.-An
ordinance of the city of Chicago provided that all vehicles used upon the
streets of the city, including those for private use, for pleasure, etc., should
pay an annual license fee. The ordinance covered bicycles and all other
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wheeled vehicles propelled by horse power or by the rider. Held, such an
ordinance was void as constituting double taxation, it appearing that the
plaintiffs paid an ad volorem tax also. Such a license also constituted a tax
that was unequal and not uniform.
MASTER AND SERVANT-VICE PRINCIPAL-SCAFFOLDING-F. C. AUSTIN MFG.
Co. v. JOHNSON, 89 Fed. 677.-A company engaged in the construction of
bridges sent a man to superintend the placing in position of a bridge. He
employed workmen and had entire charge of the work, and was without
instructions from his employers. He directed the construction of a scaffolding
to furnish a place for the men to work upon and to support part of the bridge
during construction. This scaffolding gave way and a workman was injured.
Held, that the company was liable, the man directing the work being a vice
principal and the company being obliged to furnish safe scaffolding, Sanborn,
Circuit Judge, dissenting, on the ground that the master is not liable to the
servant when he employs him to construct a building, and the servant has to
construct false work-a scaffolding or staging-to enable him to accomplish
his undertaking. In such cases the duty of care in construction of the false
work is on the servant also on the ground that as a matter of fact the agent in
control was not a vice principal.
PERSONs--DIVORCE-SUrPORT PENDING ACrIoN-BAILIE V. BALIE, 53 N. Y.
Sup. 866.-In an action by a husband for a divorce, the wife defended against
the accusation of adultery, by asserting the validity of a foreign divorce, and
her subsequent marriage under such decree. Held, such defense was not suffi-
cient to relieve the husband of the liability for his alleged wife's counsel fees.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DEEDS FROM CLIENT TO ATTORNEY-HAWKINS V.
DUNMORE, 54 N. Y. Sup. 165.-In an action to enforce an alleged parol agree-
ment to reconvey property it appeared that the plaintiff had transferred the
property to her attorney by a deed absolute on its face and for an expressed
consideration. Said transfer was made that certain claims might be enforced
against a third party in the name of her attorney, rather than in her name and
with the oral agreement that upon the settlement of those claims he would
reconvey the property to the plaintiff. Held, that because of the fiduciary
relations between the parties, the defense of the statute of frauds would not
be allowed. Ryan v'. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227,
234.
TRUSTS-INSTRUCTIONS TO TRUSTEEs:-ARTICLES OF SEPARATION-CRAWFORD
v. WINsTON, 54 N. Y. Sup. 246.-A husband and wife drew up articles of sepa-
tion and appointed trustees of a settlement for the maintenance of their child
until her marriage or majority, the money to be paid over to the wife. A
divorce was afterwards granted, and the husband notified the trustees not to
pay over any more money. The trustee under the circumstances asked the
aid and instruction of the court as to what disposition should be made of the
money in his hands. Held, that as the trust had not by its terms come to an
end, a trust fund still remaining in the hands of the trustee for distribution,
and as no accounting by the trustee had been asked for, no question had been
presented requiring the action of the court. Van Brunt, T. J., concurred, but
objected to the main opinions as written in that they did the very thing which
the court held they had no right to do, namely, gave advice to a trustee as to
the execution of his trust.
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